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Abstract
This paper deals with products of moderate-size primes, familiarly
known as smooth numbers. Smooth numbers play a crucial role in
information theory, signal processing and cryptography.
We present various properties of smooth numbers relating to their
enumeration, distribution and occurrence in various integer sequences.
We then turn our attention to cryptographic applications in which
smooth numbers play a pivotal role.
1
1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to shed light on the prominent role played by di-
visibility and smoothness in cryptography and related areas of mathematics.
This work intends to survey a wide range of results while steering away from
too well-known examples. For doing so, we concentrate on some recently
discovered applications of results about the arithmetic structure of integers.
We intend to convey to the reader a general comprehension of the state
of the art, allow the devising of correct heuristics when problems cannot be
tackled theoretically and help assessing the plausibility of new results.
In Section 3 we overview on a number of number-theoretic results com-
monly used for studying the multiplicative structure of integers. Most of
the elementary results which we use are readily available from [89]; more
advanced results can be found, often in much more precise forms, in [50, 86,
91, 100, 156] and in many other standard analytic number theory manuals.
Some of them are directly used in this paper, others remain in the back-
ground but we illustrate with them the variety of cryptographically useful
analytic number theory tools.
We start our exploration of the worlds of divisibility and smoothness
by asking a number of natural questions. For instance, given a “typical”
integer, what can be said about its largest divisor? Are Euler totient function
values ϕ(n) “typical” integers? What are the noteworthy properties of shifted
primes p− 1? How common are numbers who factor into products of primes
which are all smaller than a bound b? The results listed here are neither
exhaustive nor new (we refer the reader to references such number theory
books or surveys such as [85, 87, 95] for a more formal and systematic topical
treatment).
Then, in Section 9, we use these results to shed light on a number of
cryptographic constructions and attacks.
We remark that the specifics of this area is such that many impressive
works here may be underrated by non-expetrs as, at a first glance, they
present only very small improvements over previously known results. How-
ever these small improvements are often principal steps forward and require
the development of new ideas and very refined techniques. Some examples
of such breakthrough achievements include:
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• the estimate of Ford [61] on the counting function for the number of
values of the Euler function, see Section 3.5;
• the estimates of Ford [64] on the counting function of integers with an
integer divisor in a given interval, see Section 8.3;
• the very tight estimates of Croot, Granville, Pemantle & Tetali [53] on
the stopping time of the Dixon factoring algorithm, see Section 9.1.
Probably the oldest application of smoothness and divisibility is the cel-
ebrated Chinese Remainder Theorem which allows us to accelerate cryp-
tographic functions and basic arithmetic operations using specific integer
formats called residue number systems, see [129]. Results of this kind cer-
tainly deserve an independent treatment and we leave them outside of the
framework of this paper.
We also recall that the idea of breaking a complex operation, depending
on a parameter n, into a a recursion of simpler operations depending on the
prime factors of n can also be found in other fields such as signal processing.
The finite Fourier transform of a complex n-dimensional vector y is the
n-dimensional vector Y defined as
Yk =
n−1∑
j=0
ωjkn yj.
where ωn = e
−2πi/n is a complex n-th root of unity Now, assume that n = 2m
is even. We see that
Yk =
n−1∑
j=0
j even
ωjkn yj +
n−1∑
j=0
j odd
ωjkn yj =
m−1∑
j=0
ωjkm y2j + ω
k
n
m−1∑
j=0
ωjkm y2j+1
In other words, the initial finite Fourier transform can be broken into two
transforms of length n/2 on the projections of y on even and odd dimensions.
The same applies to divisibility by any prime or prime power and us allows
to derive a recursive Fast Fourier Transform algorithm of sub-quadratic com-
plexity when n is smooth, [36, 75]. Applications of this kind are also left out
as we restrict ourselves to the cryptographic genre.
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In general number theoretic results first appear as such, then, if appro-
priate, they are either directly applied or fine-tuned for cryptographic ap-
plications. Nonetheless, there are cases when important developments in
cryptography have led to new arithmetic results. For example, such is the
bound of Coppersmith, Howgrave-Graham & Nagaraj [46] on the number
of divisors d | n of a given integer n in a prescribed arithmetic progression
d ≡ a (mod k), which is based on the ideas of the celebrated attack of Cop-
persmith [43, 44] on RSA moduli with partially known factors. Yet another
example is given by Boneh [22], sec:const smooth see Section 6.2 below.
2 Conventions
2.1 Notations
Throughout this paper we use Vinogradov’s notation ‘f(x) ≪ g(x)’ which
is equivalent to the Landau notation f(x) = O(g(x)), whilst being easier
to chain as, for example, f(x) ≪ g(x) = h(x).1 If convenient, we also
write g(x) ≫ f(x) instead of f(x) ≪ g(x). We also write f(x) ≍ g(x) if
f(x)≪ g(x)≪ f(x).
The letter p (possibly subscripted) always denotes a prime; ε always
stands for a small positive parameter on which implied constants may depend;
log x denotes the natural logarithm of x. Calligraphic letters, for example,
A = (an), usually denote sequences of integers.
For a prime power q, we use IFq to denote the finite field of q elements.
For an integer m, we use ZZN to denote the residue ring modulo N .
2.2 Arithmetic Functions
We use the following standard notations for the most common arithmetic
functions for integers m ≥ 2:
• P (m), the largest prime divisor of m,
1Note that f(x) = O(g(x)) = h(x) is meaningless and f(x) = O(g(x)) = O(h(x)) may
discard some useful information.
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• ϕ(m), the Euler (totient) function of m,
• ω(m), the number of distinct prime divisors of m,
• τ(m), the number of positive integer divisors of m.
Recall that ϕ(m) is the number of positive integers i ≤ m with gcd(i,m) =
1 amdm that τ(m) is sometimes denoted as σ0(m).
We also define P (1) = ω(1) = 0 and τ(1) = ϕ(1) = 1.
Clearly 2ω(m) ≤ τ(m) and the inequality is tight for square-free m ≥ 1.
Letting x ≥ 0 be a real number, we denote by:
• π(x) the number of primes p ≤ x,
• π(x; q, a) the number of primes p ≤ x such that p ≡ a (mod q).
2.3 Integer Sequences
Besides the sequence of natural numbers IN, we devote in this paper particular
attention to the following integer sequences:
• Pa = {p+ a : p prime},
• f(IN) = {f(n) : n = 1, 2 . . .},
• ϕ(IN) = {ϕ(n) : n = 1, 2 . . .},
• ϕ(Pa) = {ϕ(p+ a) : p prime}.
In other words, Pa is the sequence of shifted primes, f(IN) is the sequence
of polynomial valuations over IN, ϕ(IN) is the sequence of Euler function
values and ϕ(Pa) is the sequence of Euler function values of shifted primes.
Amongst the sequence Pa, the instances a = ±1 are of special interest
in cryptography and thus many papers concentrate only on these values. As
results can usually be extended to any a 6= 0 at the cost of mere typographical
changes, this work usually presents these results in this more general form.
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2.4 Smoothness
n ∈ IN is smooth if n has only small prime divisors. As the previous sentence
does not define what small is, we formally define n as y-smooth if all prime
divisors p | n are such that p ≤ y.
Alternatively, n is y-smooth if and only if P (n) ≤ y.
Let A = (an) be a sequence. We denote by ψ(x, y;A) the number of
y-smooth an values found amongst the first x elements of A (that is, for
n ≤ x). The following compact notations are used for the specific sequences
defined in Section 2.3:
ψ(x, y) = ψ(x, y; IN),
πa(x, y) = ψ(x, y;Pa),
ψf (x, y) = ψ(x, y; f(IN)),
Φ(x, y) = ψ(x, y;ϕ(IN)),
Πa(x, y) = ψ(x, y;ϕ(Pa)).
2.5 The Dickman–de Bruijn Function
The Dickman–de Bruijn function ρ(u) is probably the most popular smooth-
ness density estimation tool.
ρ(u) is defined recursively by:
ρ(u) =

1 if 0 ≤ u ≤ 1,
1−
∫ t
n
ρ(v − 1)
v
dv if u > 1.
Note that ρ(u) = 1− log u for 1 ≤ u ≤ 2. For example, ρ(√e) = 1/2, that
is, about half of the integers n ≤ x has no prime divisors larger than n1/√e =
n0.6065.... This has been used by Vinogradov [164] and by Burgess [33], to
estimate the smallest quadratic non-residue modulo a prime.
It is not difficult to show that as u→∞:
ρ(u) = u−u+o(u) (1)
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and, more precisely,
ρ(u) =
(
e + o(1)
u logu
)u
;
even more accurate approximations to ρ(u) are known, see [156, Chap-
ter III.5, Theorem 8].
3 Number Theoretic Facts
3.1 Distribution of Primes
The Prime Number Theorem states that for any fixed A:
π(x) = lix+O
(
x
(log x)A
)
, (2)
where
lix =
∫ x
2
d t
log t
.
Alternatively, using a more convenient (yet equivalent) formulation, in terms
of the ϑ-function
ϑ(x) =
∑
p≤x
log p
we can write that for any fixed A > 0:
ϑ(x) = x+O
(
x
(log x)A
)
.
A commonly committed crime against primes is the assertion that:
π(x) =
x
log x
+O
(
x
(log x)A
)
for any fixed A > 0, which is wrong, although, of course,
π(x) ∼ lix ∼ x
log x
.
An asymptotic estimate of the number of primes in arithmetic progres-
sions is given by the Siegel–Walfisz theorem see [50, Theorem 1.4.6] or, in
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an alternative form, [156, Chapter II.8, Theorem 5], which states that for
every fixed A > 0 there exists C > 0 such that for x ≥ 2 and for all positive
integers q ≤ (log x)A,
max
gcd(a,q)=1
∣∣∣∣π(x; q, a)− lixϕ(q)
∣∣∣∣≪ x exp (−C√log x) ,
see also [100, Theorem 5.27].
While for larger values of q, only conditional asymptotic formulae are
known, for example, subject to the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis), the
Brun-Titchmarsh theorem, see [86, Chapter 3, Theorem 3.7], or [100, The-
orem 6.6], or [156, Chapter I.4, Theorem 9], gives a tight upper bound on
π(x; q, a) for all q ≤ x1−ε. Namely, we have
π(x; q, a)≪ x
ϕ(q) log(x/q)
without any restrictions on x and q.
Clearly for all q ≤ x1−ε we can replace log(x/q) in the denominator with
log x. Furthermore, this is conjectured to hold with just log x instead of
log(x/q) in a wider range of q (say up to q ≤ x/(log x)A with some constant
A > 0).
Finally, although for any given q, the Siegel–Walfisz theorem is the best
know result, the Bombieri–Vinogradov theorem, see [100, Theorem 17.1],
gives a much better estimate of π(x; q, a) on average over q. In particular,
for every A > 0 there exists B such that∑
q≤√x/(log x)B
max
y≤x
max
gcd(a,q)=1
∣∣∣∣π(y; q, a)− liyϕ(q)
∣∣∣∣≪ x(log x)A .
We conclude with the trivial but helpful remark that the bounds
π(x; q, a) ≤ π(x) and π(x; q, a) ≤ x
q
,
can also be sufficient sometimes to establish useful results.
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3.2 Mertens Formulae
We recall the Mertens formulae for the sums over primes∑
p≤x
1
p
= log log x+ A + o(1),
∑
p≤x
log p
p
= log x+B + o(1)
and for the product ∏
p≤x
(
1− 1
p
)
=
C + o(1)
log x
, (3)
where A = 0.2614 . . ., B = 1.3325 . . ., C = eγ = 1.7810 . . . and as before, γ =
0.5772 . . . is the Euler-Mascheroni constant, see [89, Sections 22.7 and 22.8]
or [156, Sections I.1.4 and I.1.5]. Vinogradov [163] gives a sharp bound of
the error term.
Note that the formula (3) is related to the fact that ϕ(n) is rather large:
n ≥ ϕ(n)≫ n
log log n
.
3.3 Primes and the Zeta-Function
The Riemann Zeta-function ζ(s) is defined for any s ∈ C with ℜ(s) > 1 by
ζ(s) =
∞∑
n=1
1
ns
,
and then is analytically continued to all s ∈ C.
The Riemann Hypothesis postulates that all the zeros of ζ(s) with 0 ≤
ℜ(s) ≤ 1 are such that ℜ(s) = 1/2. It is important to remind that there are
other trivial zeros outside of the critical strip 0 ≤ ℜ(s) ≤ 1.
The Generalized Riemann Hypothesis asserts that the same property
holds for a much wider class of similar functions called L-functions.
There are some explicit formulae that relate π(x) to the zeros of ζ in the
critical strip. In particular, the non-vanishing ζ(1 + it)ζ(it) 6= 0 for every
t ∈ IR implies the Prime Number Theorem under the form π(x) ∼ lix. In
fact the more we know about the distribution of the zeros of ζ the better is
the bound on |π(x)− lix| we get.
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The best known result on the zero-free region of ζ is due to Ford [63], who
gives a more explicit version of the previous result obtained independently
by Korobov [107] and Vinogradov [165], see also [100]. In particular, thanks
to these results, the asymptotic formula (2) can be sharpened as
π(x)− lix≪ x exp (−C(log x)3/5(log log x)−1/5)
where C = 0.2098. A similar estimate for ϑ(x) can be obtained as well.
Unfortunately, besides the result of Ford [63] and a few other similar
estimates, very little progress has been witnessed in this area over the last
decades.
For ℜ(s) > 1, the Dirichlet product is defined as:∏
p
(
1− 1
ps
)−1
=
∏
p
(
1 +
1
ps
+
1
p2s
+
1
p3s
+ . . .
)
=
∞∑
n=1
1
ns
= ζ(s).
More generally, letting S be any set of primes, and letting NS be the set
of integers obtained by multiplying elements of S, we have:∏
p∈S
(
1− 1
ps
)−1
=
∑
n∈NS
1
ns
. (4)
3.4 Beyond the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis
There is a common belief that the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis (GRH)
fully characterizes the distribution of primes. This is unfortunately untrue
and in many situations the GRH falls short of our expectations and heuristic
predictions. For example, for the gaps dn = pn+1 − pn between consecutive
primes p1 < p2 < . . . the GRH only implies that dn ≪ p1/2n (log pn)2, while
gaps are expected to be much smaller (and even be equal to 2 infinitely
often). Another example is the Elliott-Hallberstam Conjecture, see [100,
Section 17.1], which asserts that for any fixed ε > 0 and A > 1∑
q≤x1−ε
max
gcd(a,q)=1
∣∣∣∣π(x; q, a)− lixϕ(q)
∣∣∣∣≪ x(log x)A .
10
On the other hand, and quite amazingly, unconditional results on the
distribution of primes which are stronger than results immediately implied
by the GRH exist. One such estimates is the Brun-Titchmarsh theorem, see
Section 3.1. Other examples include a thread of works by Bombieri, Fried-
lander & Iwaniec [19, 20, 21] which extends Bombieri–Vinogradov’s theorem,
see Section 3.1, beyond the square-root range.
One of the important applications of these result is a remarkable result
of Mikawa [126], which asserts that for any fixed a and almost all q there is
a prime p ≡ a (mod q) with
p ≤ q32/17+o(1)
as q → ∞. For all q, the best know estimate p ≪ q11/2 is due to Heath-
Brown [92].
3.5 Euler Function
Here are a few beautiful properties of the Euler function which can be found in
many standard number theory manuals (see, for example, [89]) For example,
it is easy to see that
∑
d|m
ϕ(d) = m and ϕ(m) = m
∑
d|m
µ(d)
d
, (5)
where µ(d) is the Mo¨bius function. Furthermore, we have the identity
∞∑
m=1
ϕ(m)qm
1− qm =
q
(1− q)2 .
Using (5) and simple analytic estimates one can derive the following asymp-
totic formulae:
1
m2
m∑
k=1
ϕ(k) =
3
π2
+O
(
logm
m
)
and
1
m
m∑
k=1
ϕ(k)
k
=
6
π2
+O
(
logm
m
)
.
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We also have explicit inequalities such as:
ϕ(m) >
m log logm
eγ(log logm)2 + 3
for m ≥ 3, where γ = 0.5772 . . . is the Euler-Mascheroni constant, and
ϕ(m) >
√
m
2
for any m ≥ 1. Finally, for composite m:
ϕ(m) ≤ m−√m.
There are also some much deeper questions about the Euler function. One
of the is studying the cardinality
F (x) = #{ϕ(n) ≤ x}
of the set of values of the Euler function up to x, for which Ford [61] obtained
a very precise estimate.
Ford [62] has also established the validity of the Serpin´ski conjecture that
for any integer k ≥ 2 there is m such that the equation ϕ(n) = m has
exactly k solutions. We recall that by the Carmichael conjecture for any m
this equation has either at least two solutions or no solutions at all.
4 How Smooth? How Many?
4.1 Empirical Estimates: A Cautionary Note
Empirical estimates abound in cryptography. For examples, many cryptog-
raphers readily admit that, in the absence of obvious divisibility conditions,
the density of primes in a given integer sequence is identical to the density of
primes in IN. This and several similar “postulates” can be frequently found
throughout modern cryptographic literature. Let us illustrate the danger of
such assumptions by a concrete example.
It is natural to approximate the probability that p ∤ n when n ≤ x is
randomly chosen by 1− 1/p.
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Now, assuming that all primes p ≤ y are independent, we may infer that
the probability that p ∤ n for all x ≥ p > y when n ≤ x is chosen at random
is close to:∏
x≥p>y
(
1− 1
p
)
=
∏
p≤x
(
1− 1
p
)∏
p≤y
(
1− 1
p
)−1
∼ log y
log x
=
1
u
by virtue of the Mertens formula, where u is given by
u =
log x
log y
or x = yu. (6)
Here intuition leads to the seemingly elegant asymptotic formula
ψ(x, y) ∼ x
u
.
which is . . . completely wrong!
4.2 Estimating Smooth Integer Densities
One of the most popular estimates of ψ(x, y) is:
ψ(x, y) = u−u+o(u)x. (7)
This formula, due to Canfield, Erdo˝s & Pomerance [34], is applicable in the
very large range:
u ≤ y1−ε or y ≥ (log x)1+ε
but the behavior of ψ(x, y) changes for y < log x.
While (7) is not an asymptotic formula (since o(u) is in the exponent),
asymptotic formulae for ψ(x, y) exist. In particular, Hildebrand [94] gave the
asymptotic formula
ψ(x, y) ∼ ρ(u)x (8)
for
u ≤ exp ((log y)3/5−ε) or y ≥ exp ((log log x)5/3+ε) .
A precise estimate of the error term in (8) is given by Saias [142].
13
Note that (7) and (8) imply (1); of course (1) can also be obtained inde-
pendently.
Unfortunately the validity range of (8) is much narrower than that of (7),
and is likely to remain so for quite some time. Indeed, as per another result
of Hildebrand [93], the validity of (8) in the range:
1 ≤ u ≤ y1/2−ε or y ≥ (log x)2+ε
is equivalent to the Riemann Hypothesis.
5 Estimating ψ(x, y)
5.1 Counting Very Smooth Numbers: Lattices
To estimate ψ(x, y) for very small values of y one can resort to a geometric
approach introduced by Ennola [58], which has been developed up to its
natural limit by Granville [82] (see also [81]):
Let 2 = p1 < . . . < ps ≤ y be all s = π(y) primes up to y. Then:
ψ(x, y) = #
{
(α1, . . . , αs) :
s∏
i=1
pαii ≤ x
}
= #
{
(α1, . . . , αs) :
s∑
i=1
αi log pi ≤ log x
}
.
Thus our question boils-down to counting integer points in a specific
tetrahedron. The number of integer points in any “reasonable” convex body
is close to its volume. However, this is correct only if the volume is large
with respect to its dimension s.
Thus we may expect that:
ψ(x, y) ≈ (log x)
s
s!
∏s
i=1 log pi
if y is reasonably small. This approach can yield rigorous estimates, see, for
example, [81].
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5.2 Upper Bounds: Rankin’s Method
For large values of y, the geometric approach fails to produce useful estimates.
If only an upper bound is required, as is the case in many situations, then
Rankin’s method [139] provides a reliable alternative.
Fix any constant c > 0. Then
ψ(x, y) =
∑
n≤x
p|n⇒p≤y
1 ≤
∑
n≤x
p|n⇒p≤y
(x
n
)c
=
∑
p|n⇒p≤y
(x
n
)c
. (9)
The underlying idea is that most of the contribution to ψ(x, y) comes
from integers which are close to x, so, although (x/n)c is larger than one for
such integers, it is not much larger. On the other hand, (x/n)c decreases
rapidly to zero when n is much larger than x. So the above two steps do not
cause over-counts.
Using the fact that the right hand side of (9) is an infinite series which
can be represented as a Dirichlet product (see (4)), we get:
ψ(x, y) ≤ xc
∑
p|n⇒p≤y
1
nc
= xc
∏
p≤y
(
1− 1
pc
)−1
. (10)
Using the Prime Number Theorem (in its best available asymptotic form)
we estimate the product on the right hand side of (10) as a function of y and
c and minimize over all possible choices of c > 0.
This task is technical but feasible and yields the quasi-optimal choice:
c = 1− u log u
log y
which, in turn, yields an upper bound of the form (7).
Simplicity (despite a few final technicalities) is the main advantage of
this approach. In exchange, it suits only upper bounds and is apparently
incapable of producing lower bounds.
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5.3 Asymptotic Formula: Buchstab–de Bruijn’s Re-
currence
We write each y-smooth n > 1, as n = pm where p = P (n) is the largest
prime factor of n. We note that m ≤ x/p and is p-smooth.
Collecting together integers n with P (n) = p we get:
ψ(x, y) = 1 +
∑
p≤y
ψ
(
x
p
, p
)
(11)
(where 1 at the front accounts for n = 1), which is called the Buchstab–de
Bruijn’s Recurrence.
This recurrence formula has been used for both lower and upper bounds
and even for deriving asymptotic formulae.
We now use (11) to “prove” (8) for each fixed u (we closely follow [85,
Section 3.5].
The “proof” is by induction over N , where u ∈ (N,N + 1]. To ease the
comprehension we deliberately ignore error terms and use the sign ≈ without
specifying its formal meaning. However, we do guarantee to the reader that
more careful analysis can re-cast the following formulae into a proper proof.
We start with the observation that for 0 < u ≤ 1 we trivially have
ψ(x, x1/u) = ⌊x⌋.
For 1 < u ≤ 2 (that is, for x ≥ y ≥ √x), noticing that non-y-smooth
numbers have one and only one prime divisor p ≥ y, we get:
ψ(x, y) = x−
∑
y≤p≤x
#{m : m ≤ x
p
} = x−
∑
y≤p≤x
⌊
x
p
⌋
≈ x− x
∑
y≤p≤x
1
p
= x
(
1−
∑
2≤p≤x
1
p
+
∑
2≤p≤y
1
p
)
.
Therefore, by the Mertens formula,
ψ(x, y) ≈ x(1− (log log x− log log y))
≈ x
(
1− log log x
log y
)
= x(1− log u) = xρ(u).
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We now note that the above step. . . has not really necessary. It is nonethe-
less a good warming exercise for the next “induction” step.
Suppose that
ψ(x, x1/u) ∼ x
ρ(u)
holds for 0 ≤ u ≤ N .
Consider a value of u ∈ (N,N + 1].
Subtracting the Buchstab–de Bruijn relation (11) with y = x1/N :
ψ(x, x1/N ) = 1 +
∑
p≤x1/N
ψ
(
x
p
, p
)
from the same relation with y = x1/u:
ψ(x, x1/u) = 1 +
∑
p≤x1/u
ψ
(
x
p
, p
)
.
We obtain
ψ(x, x1/u) = ψ(x, x1/N )−
∑
x1/u<p≤x1/N
ψ
(
x
p
, p
)
≈ x
ρ(N)− ∑
x1/u<p≤x1/N
1
p
× ρ
(
log(x/p)
log p
)
since
log(x/p)
log p
=
log x
log p
− 1 < log x
log(x1/u)
− 1 = u− 1 ≤ N,
so the induction hypothesis applies (error terms ignored).
We now recall the definition of the function ϑ(z) and the Prime Number
Theorem (2). Writing z = x1/t, by partial summation, we get
∑
x1/u<p≤x1/N
1
p
ρ
(
log(x/p)
log p
)
=
∫ x1/N
x1/u
ρ
(
log x
log z
− 1
)
dϑ(z)
z log z
≈
∫ x1/N
x1/u
ρ
(
log x
log z
− 1
)
dz
z log z
=
∫ u
N
ρ(t− 1)dt
t
.
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We confess that a terrible offence has just been committed: instead dif-
ferentiating ϑ(z) we have differentiated its approximation z. However, more
careful examination shows that the above formulae are still correct.
Therefore
ψ(x, x1/u) ≈ x
(
ρ(N)−
∫ u
N
ρ(t− 1)dt
t
)
= ρ(u)x
which concludes our “proof”.
Estimating the largest prime divisor is a necessary step in many number-
theoretic algorithms. For instance, Bach, von zur Gathen & Lenstra [3]
introduce an algorithm for factoring polynomials over finite fields of charac-
teristic p. The complexity of this algorithm depends on the largest prime
divisor of the product the k cyclotomic polynomial Φk(p) evaluated at p. A
relationship between a number and its largest divisor allows to tune k for
every p and optimize complexity. We refer the reader to [141, 144, 168] for
more related results.
6 Smoothness Miscellanea
6.1 Evaluating ψ(x, y)
To optimize (balance) the complexity of steps in several cryptographic algo-
rithms, one often needs more precise information about ψ(x, y) than current2
estimates and asymptotic formulae can provide.
For example, Parsell & Sorenson [134], improving several previous results
of Bernstein [15], have shown that for any parameter α, one can estimate
ψ(x, y) up to a factor 1 +O (α−1 log x) in time
O
(
αy2/3
log y
+ α log x logα
)
.
A number of related results can be found in [98, 147, 153, 154].
2proven or conjectured
18
6.2 Constructing Constrained Smooth Numbers
Producing smooth numbers is trivial. However, constructing constrained
smooth numbers appears to be a challenging problem. A natural constraint,
stemming from the study of digital signatures, is the requirement that the
y-smooth number belongs to a given interval [x, x+ z].
Boneh [22], motivated by certain cryptographic problems, has devised a
polynomial-time algorithm solving this problem for some x, y, z parameter
combinations.
Results about the existence of very smooth numbers with a prescribed bit
pattern at a certain position are given in [145], see also [80] which gives an
alternative approach (via character sums instead of exponential sums) that
may probably be used to further improve the aforementioned result of [145].
More research in this area is certainly very desirable.
6.3 Rough Numbers
An integer n is y-rough if all prime divisors p | n are such that p > y. We
denote by Ω(x, y) be the number of y-rough integers smaller than x.
Buchstab [32] gives the asymptotic formula:
Ω(x, y) ∼ ω(u) x
log y
,
where the Buchstab function ω(u) is defined as follows:
ω(u) =
1
u
×

1, if 1 ≤ u ≤ 2,
1−
∫ u−1
1
ω(t)dt, if u ≥ 2.
Rough numbers can be viewed as “approximations” to primes. Rough
numbers can be easily found and are proven to exist in various integer se-
quences of cryptographic interest. For example, Joye, Paillier & Vaude-
nay [102] use rough numbers as ”interesting” candidates for primality testing
during cryptographic key generation.
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6.4 Large Smooth Divisors
It also natural to ask how often integers are expected to have a large smooth
divisor; or, from a more quantitative perspective, explore the behavior of:
Θ(x, y, z) = #{n ≤ x : ∃d | n, d > z, d is y-smooth}.
While Θ has been addressed in the classical literature on smooth numbers,
see [87, 156, 157], it has not received as much attention as ψ(x, y).
Some asymptotic formulae for Θ have recently been given by Banks &
Shparlinski [11] and Tenenbaum [159]. These formulae involve the parameter
u appearing in (6) and a parameter v defined as:
v =
log z
log y
.
The formulae also contain an integral involving ρ(u) and its derivative.
Part of the motivation in [11] comes from a cryptographic problem discussed
by Menezes [122], see as well Section 9.12.
Shifted primes with large smooth divisors are studied by Pomerance &
Shparlinski [137].
6.5 Next Largest Prime Divisors
Characterizing the second largest prime divisor is of interest too, as the
complexity of factoring an integer n with Lenstra’s elliptic curve factorization
method [111] (commonly called ‘the ECM’), depends on this prime divisor.
More generally, denoting by Pj(n) the j-th largest prime divisor of n, one
may consider the joint distribution
ψ(x, y1, . . . , yk) = #{n ≤ x | Pj(n) ≤ yj, j = 1, . . . , k}.
The work of Tenenbaum [158] contains the most recent results and further
references on this topic.
The case k = 2 is especially important. Indeed, using above notation, the
ECM algorithm factors n completely in time:
exp
(
(2 + o(1))
√
log p log log p
)
nO(1),
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where p = P2(n). This case has also got special attention in [4], see also [152]
for some other applications.
6.6 Other Facts
In this section we present several unrelated results, which while unlikely to
have any obvious cryptographic applications, still prove interesting for our
exploration of smooth numbers.
Balog and Wooley [8] have considered k-tuples of consecutive smooth
integers and proved that for any k and ε > 0 there are infinitely many n such
that n + i is nε-smooth for i = 1, . . . , k. In fact the proof in [8] is based on
very nice and elementary explicit constructions.
One can also take k →∞ and ε→ 0 (slowly) when n→∞.
Balog [6] proved that each sufficiently large integer N can be written as
N = n1 + n2 where n1, n2 are N
α-smooth, where
α =
4
9
√
e
= 0.2695 . . . .
Results of this type may be considered as dual to the binary Goldbach
conjecture claiming that all positive even integers N ≥ 4 can be represented
as the sum of two primes.
Finally, various bounds of rational exponential sums
Sa,q(x, y) =
∑
n≤x
n is y-smooth
exp
(
2πi
an
q
)
, where gcd(a, q) = 1,
are given by Fouvry & Tenenbaum [69] and also by de la Brete`che & Tenen-
baum [27]. Multiplicative character sums
Ta,q(x, y) =
∑
n≤x
n is y-smooth
χ(n− a), where gcd(a, q) = 1,
with a nonprincipal multiplicative character χ modulo q are estimated [146].
We also note that asymptotic formulae for the sums∑
a<n≤x
n is y-smooth
ϕ(n− a)
n− a and
1
ψ(x, y)
∑
a<n≤x
n is y-smooth
ϕ(n− a)
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are given in [117]. On the other hand, obtaining asymptotic formulae (or
even good estimates) for the sums
1
ψ(x, y)
∑
a<n≤x
n is y-smooth
τ(n− a) and 1
ψ(x, y)
∑
a<n≤x
n is y-smooth
ω(n− a),
is still an open problem.
7 Smoothness in Integers Sequences
7.1 Smooth Numbers in Arithmetic Progressions
So far we considered the distribution of smooth values in the set of all natural
numbers. A very natural generalization of this question, which is also of
cryptographic interest, is the study of smooth numbers with an additional
congruence condition.
In particular, we introduce the counting functions
ψ(x, y; a, q) = #{n ≤ x : n is y-smooth, n ≡ a (mod q)}
and
ψ∗q (x, y) = #{n ≤ x : n is y-smooth, gcd(n, q) = 1}.
Tenenbaum [155] proved that
ψq(x, y) ∼ ϕ(q)
q
ψ(x, y)
in a wide range of parameters.
In turn, a family of bounds of the forms
ψ(x, y; a, q) ∼ 1
ϕ(q)
ψq(x, y),
ψ(x, y; a, q) ≍ 1
ϕ(q)
ψq(x, y),
ψ(x, y; a, q) ≫ 1
ϕ(q)
ψq(x, y),
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(of decreasing strength but in increasingly larger ranges of x, y and q) can
be found in [7, 70, 83, 84, 90, 148]. Some of these bounds hold for all a with
gcd(a, q) = 1, others hold only for almost all such integers a.
We note that bounds of exponential and character sums Sa,q(x, y) and
Ta,q(x, y), see Section 6.6, can also be interpreted as results about the uni-
formity of distribution of smooth numbers in arithmetic progressions “on
average”.
7.2 Smooth Numbers in Small Intervals
We now turn our attention to the sequence of integers in “short” intervals
[x, x+ z).
Accordingly,
ψ(x, y, z) = ψ(x+ z, y)− ψ(x, y).
It is natural to expect that:
ψ(x, y, z) ∼ ρ(u)z
in a wide range of x, y and z.
A series of ingenious results due to Balog [5], Croot [52], Friedlander
& Granville [72], Friedlander & Lagarias [72], Harman [90] and Xuan [161]
gives various interesting bits of information, but in general the status of this
problem is far from being satisfactory.
Croot’s work [52] is particularly interesting as it uses a quite unusual
tool: bounds of bilinear Kloosterman sums due to Duke, Friedlander &
Iwaniec [56].
From both cryptographic and number theoretic perspectives, the main
challenge in that of obtaining good lower bounds in ψ(x, y, 4
√
x), which ap-
pears to be currently out of reach. This case is of special importance as it
is crucial for the rigorous analysis of Lenstra’s elliptic curve factoring algo-
rithm [111]. We note that the result of Croot [52] applies to intervals of
similar length but unfortunately for y values which are much larger than
these appearing in [111].
Finally, we recall that Lenstra, Pila & Pomerance [112, 113] have found
an ingenious way to circumvent this problem by introducing a hyperelliptic
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factoring algorithm. For this algorithm, smooth numbers in large intervals
ought to be studied, which is already a feasible task. This has been achieved
at the cost of very delicate arguments and required the developing of new
algebraic and analytic tools by the authors.
7.3 Smooth Shifted Primes
Let πa(x, y) be the counting function of smooth shifted primes given in Sec-
tion 2.4.
It is strongly believed that for any fixed a 6= 0 the asymptotic formula
πa(x, y) ∼ ρ(u)π(x) (12)
holds for a wide range of x and y. Unfortunately, results of such breadth
seem unreachable using current techniques.
However rather strong upper bounds are known. For example, Pomerance
& Shparlinski [137] gave the estimate
πa(x, y)≪ uρ(u)π(x)
for
exp
(√
log x log log x
)
≤ y ≤ x.
In a shorter range
exp
(
(log x)2/3+ε
) ≤ y ≤ x
the “right” upper bound
πa(x, y)≪ ρ(u)π(x)
follows from a result of Fouvry & Tenenbaum [70, Theorem 4].
It is not just the asymptotic formula (12) which is presently out of reach.
In fact, even the obtaining of lower bounds on πa(x, y) is an extremely difficult
task where progress seems to be very slow.
The best known result, due to Baker & Harman [9] only asserts that there
is a positive constant A such that for a 6= 0,
πa(x, y)≫ π(x)
(log x)A
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for u ≤ 3.377 . . . (where as before, u is defined by (6)), see also [91].
For most applications the logarithmic loss in the density of such primes
is not important. However, if this becomes an issue, one can use bound of
Friedlander [71]:
πa(x, y)≫ π(x)
which, however, is proven only for u ≤ 2√e = 3.2974 . . ..
Finally, we recall yet another result of Baker & Harman [9] guarantees
that
π(x)− πa(x, y)≫ π(x)
for u ≥ 1.477 . . ..
The above results can be reformulated under the following equivalent
forms which are usually better known and in which they are more frequently
used.
For some absolute constants A,C > 0 and for any a 6= 0:
• there are at least Cπ(x)/(log x)A primes p ≤ x such that p + a has a
prime divisor q ≥ p0.6776;
• there are at least Cπ(x)/(log x)A primes p ≤ x such that all prime
divisors q of p+ a satisfy q ≤ p0.2962.
The above two statements are expected to hold with A = 0, with 1 − ε
instead of 0.6776 and with ε instead of 0.2962 (for any ε > 0).
It is interesting to recall that results about shifted primes p− 1 having a
large prime divisor play a central role in the deterministic primality test of
Agrawal, Kayal & Saxena [1].
7.4 Smooth Values of Polynomials
Let f(X) ∈ ZZ[X ] and let ψf (x, y) be defined as in Section 2.4.
As in the case of shifted primes, rather strong upper bounds on ψf(x, y)
exist, see for example, the results of Hmyrova [96] and Timofeev [160].
For a squarefree polynomial f , Martin [119] gives an asymptotic formula
of the type
ψf (x, y) ∼ ρ(d1u)ρ(d2u) . . . ρ(dku)x,
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where d1, d2, . . . , dk are the degrees of irreducible factors of f over ZZ[x]. This
holds only for very large values of y. See as well several related results by
Dartyge, Martin & Tenenbaum [54], where smooth values of polynomials at
prime valuations (that is, of f(p)) are also discussed.
7.5 Smooth Totients
Let Φ(x, y) and Πa(x, y) be the functions counting smooth values of the Euler
function on integers and shifted primes, respectively, see Section 2.4.
Banks, Friedlander, Pomerance & Shparlinski [10] have shown that in the
range
y ≥ (log log x)1+ε
we have
Φ(x, y) ≤ x exp(−(1 + o(1)) u log log u). (13)
There are two interesting things to note about this result:
• the range is wider than that of (7), with log log y instead of log y.
• the bound is weaker than that of (7), with log log u instead of log u in
the exponent.
Both bullet points reflect the fact that the values of Euler functions tend
to be smoother than integers and shifted primes. Furthermore, under a
plausible conjecture about smooth shifted primes similar to (12), a matching
lower bound on Φ(x, y) has been obtained in [10]. Under even stronger
conjectures, Lamzouri [109] has obtained an asymptotic formula for Φ(x, y)
and similar quantities related to iterations of the Euler function.
To estimate Πa(x, y), we can now use the trivial inequality
Πa(x, y) ≤ Φ(x+ |a|, y),
which, in fact, is quite sufficient for many applications. Furthermore, in a
wide range of parameters, unless u is small, the above is equivalent to the
expected estimate:
Πa(x, y)≪ π(x) exp (−(1 + o(1)) u log log u)
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which is a full analogue of (13).
However for small values of u, obtaining the above estimate remains an
important open problem.
On the other hand, in some ranges, several other bounds for Πa(x, y) have
been obtained in [10] using different techniques (such as a sieve method). For
example, for y ≥ exp (√log x log log x ) we have
Πa(x, y)≪ π(x)
u
,
and for y ≥ log x, we have
Πa(x, y) ≤ π(x)
exp ((1/2 + o(1))
√
u log u)
+
π(x) log log x
exp((1 + o(1))u logu)
.
Note that estimates on the number of smooth values of the Euler function
of polynomial sequences with integer and prime arguments, that is, ϕ(f(n))
and ϕ(f(p)), are given in [10] as well.
7.6 Smooth Cardinalities of Elliptic Curves
One aspect of this question has already be mentioned in Section 7.2 in relation
to the elliptic curve factoring algorithm of Lenstra [111].
It is also interesting and important to study the arithmetic structure of
cardinalities of the reductions of a given elliptic curve defined over Q modulo
distinct primes. More precisely, given an elliptic curve E over Q, we denote
by Np = #E(IFp) the cardinality of the set of rational points on the reduction
of E modulo p (for a sufficiently large prime p such reduction always leads
to an elliptic curve over IFp).
The number of prime divisors of Np has been studied by Cojocaru [40],
Iwaniec & Jime´nez Urroz [99], Jime´nez Urroz [103], Liu [114, 115, 116], Miri
& Murty [127] and Steuding & A. Weng [150].
Some heuristics about the number of prime values of Np for p ≤ x has
been discussed by Galbraith &McKee [74], Koblitz [105, 106] andWeng [166].
An upper bound on this quantity is obtained by Cojocaru, Luca & Shparlin-
ski [41], see also [39].
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However, it seems that there are no smootheness results about the num-
bers Np, although this issue has been touched in McKee [121]. Probably
obtaining an asymptotic formula or even a good lower bound on the number
of y-smooth values of Np for p ≤ x is very hard, but perhaps some upper
bounds can be established.
Results of this kind are of great importance for the elliptic curve cryp-
tography.
7.7 Smooth Class Numbers
For a integer d < 0 we denote by h(d) the class number of the imaginary
quadratic field Q(
√
d). Let D be the set of fundamental discriminants, that
is, the set of integers d < 0 such that
• either d ≡ 1 (mod 4) and d is square-free,
• or d ≡ 0 (mod 4), d/4 ≡ 2, 3 (mod 4) and d/4 is square-free.
Using the so-called Cohen–Lenstra heuristics for divisibility of class num-
bers, see [38], Hamdy & Saidak [88] derived a conditional asymptotic formula
for the number of d ∈ D with −d ≤ x for which h(d) is y-smooth. Unfortu-
nately, this seems to be the only know result in this really exciting direction,
see [31] for the relevance of these problems to cryptography. Studying the
smoothness of class numbers of other fields is of great interest too but is
perhaps a very hard question.
7.8 Smooth Numbers in Sumsets
We recall that de la Brete`che [25] gives a result of surprising generality and
strength stating that, under some conditions, the proportion of smooth num-
bers among the sums a + b, where a ∈ A and b ∈ B is close to the expected
value for a wide class of sets A,B ⊆ ZZ.
For example, let A and B be two sets of integers in the interval [1, x].
Then, for any fixed ε > 0 and uniformly for
exp
(
(log x)2/3+ε
)
< y ≤ x,
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we have
#{(a, b) ∈ A× B : a+ b is y-smooth}
= ρ(u) ·#A#B
(
1 +O
(
x log(u+ 1)√
#A#B log y
))
,
where, as usual, u is given by (6).
Although the authors are unaware of any immediate cryptographic ap-
plications of this result, we underline its high potential, given its generality
and “condition-free” formulation.
Several other relevant results are given by Croot [51].
7.9 Smooth Polynomials Over Finite Fields
In full analogy with the case of integers, we say that a polynomial F ∈ IK[x]
over a field IK is k-smooth if all irreducible divisors f | F satisfy deg f ≤ k.
For a finite field IFq of q-elements we denote
Nq(m, k) = #{f ∈ IFq[x] : deg f ≤ m f is k-smooth and monic}.
Define
u =
m
k
=
log qm
log qk
(the last expression makes the analogy with formula (6) completely explicit).
The systematic study of Nq(m, k) dates back to the work of Odlyzko [133]
who also discovered the relevance of this quantity to the discrete logarithm
problem in finite fields.
Several very precise results about Nq(m, k) have recently been given by
Bender & Pomerance [14]. For example, by [14, Theorem 2.1] we have
Nq(m, k) = u
−u+o(u)qm
as k → ∞ and u → ∞, uniformly for qk ≥ m(logm)2, and by [14, Theo-
rem 2.2] we also have
Nq(m, k) ≥ q
m
mu
for k ≤ √m.
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8 Distribution of Divisors
8.1 More On Intuition
We have already seen in Section 4.1 that carelessly applied intuition may
lead to wrong conclusions. The following is yet another example.
It is obvious that the density of perfect squares n = d2 is extremely small
as there are only ⌊√x⌋ perfect squares up to x.
Let us relax the relation n = k2 and consider n = km with k ≤ m ≤ k1.001
for k,m ∈ N . Such integers can be called quasi-squares.
It is natural to ask whether the density of quasi-squares is still small. Say,
are there only o(x) quasi-squares up to x? As the below results indicate, such
quasi-squares form a set of positive density which perhaps does not match
the intuition (too bad for the intuition . . . ).
8.2 Notations
Given a sequence of integers A = (an), we denote
H(x, y, z;A) = #{an ≤ x : ∃ d|an with y < d ≤ z}.
As usual, in the case of A = IN we define
H(x, y, z) = H(x, y, z; IN).
8.3 Natural Numbers
This case goes back to two old questions of Erdo˝s:
Given an integer N what is the size M(N) of the multiplica-
tion table {nm : 1 ≤ m,n ≤ √N}?
and
Is it true that almost all integers n have two divisors d1 | n
and d2 | n with d1 < d2 < 2d1?
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Hall & Tenenbaum’s book [87] contains a very detailed treatment of such
questions. For example, for the size of the multiplication table we have
from [64, Corollary 3]
M(N) ≍ N
(logN)δ(log logN)3/2
as N →∞, where
δ = 1− 1 + log log 2
log 2
= 0.008607 . . . (14)
is the Erdo˝s number, see also [156, Theorem 23] for a slightly less precise
result.
Ford [64] has recently obtained a series of remarkable improvements of
several previously know results. Several related results can also be found
in [26, 65, 68, 108, 156]. Unfortunately, exact formulations of precise results
lead to rather cluttered technical conditions and estimates, which also depend
on the relative sizes of x, y and z as well as on z− y and z/y. Thus we limit
our discussion to only a few sample results.
For example, let us define v > 0 by the relation
z = y1+1/v.
Then, by [64, Theorem 1] for any real x, y and z with
x ≥ max{100000, y2} and x ≥ z ≥ y ≥ 100
we have
H(x, y, z, IN)
x
≍

vδ(log v)−3/2 if 2y ≤ z ≤ y2,
1 if z ≥ y2,
where δ is the Erdo˝s number.
In particular, we see that for ε > 0 and any sufficiently large y, we have
H(x, y, y1+ε, IN)≫ x, (15)
where the implied constant only depends on ε > 0. Thus, there is a positive
density of integers n ≤ x, depending only on ε > 0, which have a divisor
d | n in the interval d ∈ [y, y1+ε].
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We now prove (15) in the special case where y is a power of x. That is,
we prove that for 0 < α < β < 1:
H(x, xα, xβ , IN)≫ x. (16)
In our proof we consider only prime divisors p ∈ [xα, xβ] (instead of integer
divisors) and make the following two trivial observations:
• there are x/p+O(1) integers n ≤ x divisible by p;
• each n ≤ x may have at most K = ⌈1/α⌉ of them.
Hence,
H(x, xα, xβ , IN) ≥ 1
K
∑
xα≤p≤xβ
(
x
p
+O(1)
)
and the sum on the right hand side counts every integer n ≤ x with a prime
divisor p ∈ [xα, xβ] at most K times. Therefore
H(x, xα, xβ, IN) ≥ x
K
∑
xα≤p≤xβ
1
p
+O(xb).
By the Mertens formula, we now obtain
H(x, xα, xβ, IN) ≥ x
K
(
log log(xβ)− log log(xα) + o(1))
=
x
K
(
log
log(xβ)
log(xα)
+ o(1)
)
=
1
K
(
log
(
β
α
)
+ o(1)
)
x
and (16) follows.
There are other tell tale signs that integer divisors are densely distributed.
For example, for an integer s ≥ 1 we denote
T (n) = max
i=1,...,τ(n)−1
di+1
di
,
where 1 = d1 < . . . < dτ(n) = n are the positive divisors of n. Clearly,
T (n) ≤ P (n).
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However, for many integers T (n) is much smaller than P (n). By a result of
Saias [143, Theorem 1], we know that for any fixed t and sufficiently large x,
# {n ≤ x : T (n) ≤ t} ≍ x log t
log x
.
8.4 Shifted Primes
Ford [64] has given upper bounds onH(x, y, z;Pa) of about the same strength
as these applying to H(x, y, z;N ), where Pa is defined in Section 2.3.
The situation with lower bounds H(x, y, z;Pa) is quite bleak, although
heuristically there is little doubt that H(x, y, z;Pa) should behave similarly
to H(x, y, z;N ).
One of the very few known lower bounds (yet, with many cryptographic
applications) is given in [64, Theorem 7]: for a 6= 0 and 0 < α < β:
H(x, xα, xβ,Pa)≫ π(x)
(where the implied constant depends on a, α and β).
The proof is similar to our proof of (16), but requires some technical
analytic number theory tools, namely, the Bombieri–Vinogradov theorem,
see Section 3.1, since instead of integers n ≤ x with p | n we need to count
primes q ≤ x with p | (q − a).
To implement this approach one also needs the elementary observation
that is enough to consider only the case 0 < α < β ≤ 1/2 (since if d÷n then
n/d is also a divisor of n).
Finally, we remark that the Brun pure sieve (that is, a properly truncated
version of the inclusion-exclusion principle), see [86, Theorem 2.3], or [156,
Theorem 3, Section I.4.2], immediately implies that for any a 6= 0
H(x, y, z;Pa) =
(
1 +O
(
log y
log z
))
π(x). (17)
For example, the bound (17) can be used for the analysis of some cryp-
tographic attacks Cheon [35].
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8.5 Polynomials
Unfortunately there seem to be no results about the distribution of integers
divisors of polynomials. Nonetheless, this problem does not look hopeless.
8.6 Cardinalities of Elliptic Curves
As in the case of polynomials, there seem to be no results about the dis-
tribution of divisors of cardinalities of elliptic curves over finite fields. The
question is certainly hard but not completely hopeless and deserves to be
studied. Furthermore, Menezes & Ustooglu [124] point out that this ques-
tion has direct cryptographic applications.
It is probable that for the set of all elliptic curves over a given finite
field IFq new results can be obtained by combining the Brun sieve technique,
see [86, Theorem 2.3], or [156, Theorem 3, Section I.4.2] with results of
Howe [97] on divisibility statistics of elliptic curves.
8.7 Totients
Here is another confirmation that totients are not typical integers.
As we have mentioned, H(x, y, z;Pa) is expected to behave similarly to
H(x, y, z;N ). However the behaviour of H(x, y, z;ϕ(IN)) is very different.
Given that typical values of the Euler function
• have more prime divisors, due to a result of Erdo˝s & Pomerance [59],
• have more integer divisors, due to a result of Luca & Pomerance [118],
• are smoother, due to a result of Banks, Friedlander, Pomerance &
Shparlinski [10], see also Section 7.5,
than a typical integer, it is also natural to expect that totients have denser
divisor sets. This is supported by several recent results of Ford & Hu [66],
who in particular show that
• uniformly over 1 ≤ y ≤ x/2, we have H(x, y, 2y;ϕ(IN))≫ x;
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• for y = xo(1), we have H(x, y, 2y;ϕ(IN)) ∼ x;
• for a positive proportion of integers n, there is a divisor d | ϕ(n) in
every interval of the form [K, 2K], 1 ≤ K ≤ n.
9 Cryptographic Applications
9.1 Smoothness in Factoring and Discrete Logarithms
Most integer factorization algorithms, such as Dixon’s method, the Quadratic
Sieve, index calculus, the Number Field Sieve or Elliptic Curve Factoring
have been designed and analyzed (either rigorously or heuristically) using
our current knowledge and understanding of smooth numbers. The same
also applies to many primality tests and algorithms for solving the discrete
logarithm problem.
Results about the arithmetic structure of “typical” integers are therefore
of high cryptographic relevance. As most results are already well publicized
in the community, we illustrate them by one example (next section) and refer
the reader to [50] for further information.
Nonetheless, new results and applications keep appearing regularly. The
works of Croot, Granville, Pemantle & Tetali [53] and of Agrawal, Kayal &
Saxena [1] are typical examples.
In [53] various results about the arithmetic structure of integers are used
to give a very precise analysis of Dixon’s factoring algorithm. In [1] results
about shifted primes with a large divisor, see Section 7.3, form the core of
the algorithm.
9.2 Index Calculus in IF∗p
We start by highlighting the role of smooth numbers in algorithms solving
the Discrete Logarithm Problem:
Namely, given two integers a and b and a prime p we consider the problem
of computing k (denoted k = Dloga b) such that b ≡ ak (mod p) and 0 ≤
k ≤ p− 2.
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The algorithm is assembled in two steps. We first use a certain (very
strong) assumption and then show how to get rid of it.
Initial Assumption: Let us fix some y (to be optimized later) and assume
that we know the discrete logarithms of all primes p1, . . . , ps up to y where
s = π(y).
Under this assumption we perform the following steps:
Step 1: Pick a random integer m and compute
c ≡ bam ≡ ak+m (mod p), 0 ≤ c < p.
Note that
Dloga c ≡ Dloga b+Dloga am ≡ Dloga b+m (mod p− 1).
The cost of this step is negligible.
Step 2: Try to factor c, assuming that c, treated as an integer, is y-smooth.
Let
c = pα11 . . . p
αs
s
For doing so use trial division or the elliptic curve factorization algo-
rithm [111].
Note that
Dloga c ≡ α1Dloga p1 + . . .+ αsDloga ps (mod p− 1).
The cost of this step is about y operations (less if [111] is used).
Step 3: If the previous step succeeds, output
Dloga b ≡ α1Dloga p1 + . . .+ αsDloga ps −m (mod p− 1),
otherwise repeat the first step.
The cost of this step is about p/Ψ(p, y) = u
(1+o(1))up
p iterations, where
up =
log p
log y
(under the assumption that c < p is a random).
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Thus the total cost, ignoring nonessential factors, is about yu
up
p .
Taking y = exp
(√
log p log log p
)
we get an algorithm of complexity
exp
(
2
√
log p log log p
)
but. . . it is premature to celebrate the victory, as we need to get rid of the
assumption that the discrete logarithms of all small primes are available.
Removing the Assumption: We apply the same algorithm for each pi,
i = 1, . . . , s as b. Then at Step 3 we get a congruence
Dloga pi ≡ α1,iDloga p1 + . . .+ αs,iDloga ps −mi (mod p− 1),
for i = 1, . . . , s.
We cannot find Dloga pi immediately but after getting such relations for
every pi, i = 1, . . . , s, we have a system of s linear congruences in s variables.
If the system is not of full rank we continue to generate a few relations until
a full rank system is reached (this overhead is negligible as most “random”
matrices are non-singular). Therefore the cost of creating such a system of
congruences is about y2u
up
p and the cost of solving it is about y3 (lesser if
fast linear algebra algorithms are used, see, for example, [75]).
Choosing y optimally, we obtain an algorithm of complexity
exp
(
O
(√
log p log log p
))
.
The above approach can be improved and optimized in many ways finally
yielding a subexponential algorithm of asymptotic complexity
exp
(√
(2 + o(1)) log p log log p
)
that can also be rigorously analyzed; this is done by Pomerance in [136].
We have presented the above example because of its illustrative value
although a much faster algorithm exists: the number field sieve, see [50],
whose complexity is exp
(O ((log p)1/3(log log p)2/3)).
One can note that the above approach uses both the structure of finite
fields and the properties of smooth numbers. Thus a prime field is substantial.
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Over an extension of a field of small characteristic, such as IF2n , elements
can be represented by polynomials and thus smooth polynomials play the
role of smooth integers. Hence, the results of Section 7.9 become of great
importance.
We note that despite a very common belief that the discrete logarithm
problem is solvable in subexponential time, this is not proved as we write
these lines.
In other words, although over the last decade fast heuristic algorithms for
the discrete logarithm problem have been designed to work over any finite
field, rigorous subexponential algorithms are known only for very specific
fields (such as prime fields IFp, their quadratic fields IFp2 or fields IFpm with
a fixed p), see [50, Section 6.4] for more details.
It is also clear that the above approach does not apply to the discrete
logarithm problem in the elliptic curve settings where smoothness admits no
analogous notion.
9.3 Textbook ElGamal Encryption
The ElGamal cryptosystem [57] makes use of two primes p, q with q | p − 1
and an element g ∈ IFp of order q (all of which are public), see also [30,
Section 8.6], or [123, Sections 8.4.1 and 8.4.2], or [151, Section 6.1] for further
details.
The receiver chooses a random private key element x ∈ ZZq and computes
the public key X = gx ∈ ZZq.
Encryption: To encrypt a message µ ∈ IFp, the sender chooses a random
r ∈ ZZq, computes R = µXr ∈ IFp, and Q = gr ∈ IFp and sends the pair
(R,Q) = (µXr, gr).
Decryption: The receiver computes (in IFp)
S = Qx = gxr = Xr and
R
S
=
R
Xr
= µ.
As most public key cryptosystems, the ElGamal protocol is quite slow. It
is hence traditionally used to wrap a block-cipher key used for securing the
subsequent communication flow.
38
Doing this in a “textbook fashion”, means that µ is a rather small integer.
For example, p can be about 500 bits long to thwart discrete logarithm
calculation attempts, but µ can be only 80 bits long to resist the brute force
search.
Boneh, Joux & Nguyen [23] have shown that in this case, with a reason-
able probability, µ can be recovered significantly faster then by any of the
above two attacks.
Let Gq be the subgroup of IF∗p of order q generated by g. We note that
R = µU where U ∈ Gq.
Let us assume that 1 ≤ µ ≤ M (where M is much smaller than p). We
also choose some bound K which is a parameter of the algorithm (controlling
the trade-off between complexity and success probability).
Step 1: Compute Rq = µqU q = µq.
Step 2: For k = 1, . . . , ⌈K⌉ compute, sort and store kq in a table.
Step 3: For m = 1, . . . , ⌈M/K⌉ compute
Rq
mq
=
( µ
m
)q
and check whether this value is present in the table of Step 2.
Step 4: Output µ = km if there is a match.
This algorithm always works with K = M (for example, m = µ, k = 1,
which is essentially a form of brute force search).
A better choice is K = M1/2+ε. Using (16), we see that the algorithm
succeeds for a positive proportion of messages. That is, it works because
with a sufficiently high probability a random positive integer µ ≤ M has a
representation µ = km with 1 ≤ k,m ≤M1/2+ε.
In other words, taking M = 280 (as in the above example as a standard
key size for a private key cryptosystem) we see that the attack runs in a little
more than 240 steps.
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9.4 Affine RSA Padding
The RSA signature scheme [140] makes use of the following parameters: a
composite modulus N , a public exponent e and private exponent d which
satisfy the congruence:
ed ≡ 1 (mod ϕ(N)),
see also [30, Section 8.3], or [123, Section 8.2], or [151, Section 5.3].
The signature s ∈ ZZN of a message m ∈ ZZN is computed as follows:
s ≡ md (mod N). Verification consist in checking that m ≡ se (mod N).
If this is applied in this “textbook” form, the scheme becomes susceptible
to a chosen message attack which works as follows.
Assume that the attacker, wishing to sign a target message m, has the
ability to ask the legitimate signer to sign seemingly meaningless messages.
Then the attacker can:
• choose a random m1 and compute
m2 ≡ m
m1
(mod N);
• query the signatures si ≡ mdi (mod N) for i = 1, 2 from the legitimate
signer;
• and compute s ≡ s1s2 (mod N).
This works because
s ≡ s1s2 ≡ md1md2 ≡ (m1m2)d ≡ md (mod N).
In other words, because RSA is homomorphic with respect to multiplica-
tion, a multiplicative relation between messages shadows a similar relation
between the signatures.
A natural defense against this attack is to restrict the signature and the
verification algorithms to messages of a prescribed structure. For example,
if N is n bits long, it is requested that the meaningful message part m is
only ℓ bits long to which a fixed (n − ℓ)-bit string (called padding pattern)
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is appended. Clearly in the above example m1 can be chosen to comply with
this format but m2 is unlikely to fulfill this constraint, which thwarts the
attack.
In the case of affine padding, signed messages have the following structure:
fixed (n− ℓ)-bit padding P | ℓ-bit message m
Thus, denoting R(m) = P +m we see that the signature s(m) of an ℓ bit
message m is computed as
s(m) ≡ R(m)d (mod N), 1 ≤ s(m) ≤ N,
(that is, P = 2ℓΠ where Π is the appended padding pattern).
In a thread of works by Misarsky [128], Girault & Misarsky [77, 78] and
Brier, Clavier, Coron & Naccache [28], existential forgery attacks on affine-
padded RSA signatures have been progressively developed and refined.
Lenstra & Shparlinski [110] have improved [28] by redesigning it as a
selective forgery attack, where the attacker can sign any message.
Let us start by presenting the basic technique introduced in [28].
Our goal is to find four distinct ℓ-bit messages m1, m2, m3, m4 such that
R(m1) · R(m2) ≡ R(m3) · R(m4) (mod N). (18)
In this case we obtain
s(m1) · s(m2) ≡ s(m3) · s(m4) (mod N),
and hence a signature onm3 can be computed from signatures onm1, m2, m4.
In [28] this has been applied to the case where all four messages are considered
as variable m1, m2, m3, m4 (which leads to an existential signature forgery),
while in [110] the messagem4 is assumed to be fixed (which leads to a selective
signature forgery).
One verifies that the congruence (18) is equivalent to
P (m3 +m4 −m1 −m2) ≡ m1m2 −m3m4 (mod N).
With
x = m1 −m4, y = m2 −m4, z = m3 +m4 −m1 −m2
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this becomes
(P +m4)z ≡ xy (mod N). (19)
We note that if m4 is already chosen, the values of x, y and z define m1, m2
and m3 uniquely.
The congruence (19) is trivial to solve without any restrictions on the
variables, but in fact we need “small” x, y and z about ℓ bits long, which is
a much harder constraint to deal with.
We show how to solve it when
ℓ =
(
1
3
+ ε
)
n.
Before we proceed with the algorithm we note that this choice of ℓ is
close to the limit of this approach given that for any fixed ε > 0 a “typical”
polynomial congruence in three variables
F (x, y, z) ≡ 0 (mod N) (20)
is unlikely to have a integer solution (x, y, z) with
1 ≤ x, y, z ≤ N1/3−ε. (21)
This is because F (x, y, z) takes only N1−3ε possible values for such x, y
and z, thus (20) is solvable under the condition (21) only with exponentially
small “probability” of order N−3ε (this estimate assumes that F behaves like
a random trivariate function and hence must not be taken literally).
Now, to find ℓ-bit solutions to the congruence (19) we first consider the
congruence
(P + s)z ≡ w (mod N), (22)
where |s| ≤ N1/3+ε is given and the variables w and z satisfy
w ≤ N2/3+2ε and |z| ≤ N1/3.
Let Ri/Qi denote the i-th continued fraction convergent to (P + s)/N ,
i = 1, 2, . . ..
Then ∣∣∣∣P + sN − RiQi
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1QiQi+1 .
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We now define j by the inequalities Qj < N
1/3 ≤ Qj+1 and set
w = |(P + s)Qj −NPj |.
Then
0 < w ≤ N
Qj+1
< N2/3 and (P + s)z ≡ w (mod N)
for some z with |z| < N1/3, namely z = ±Qj .
Now, one can certainly try to apply the above procedure with s = m4
and then check whether w can be factored as w = xy with 1 ≤ x, y < 2ℓ.
However, this would unfortunately happen only for a rather sparse sequence
of messages m4, so we may try to randomize the above idea as follows:
• Pick a random integer r with 0 ≤ r < N ε/2 and find
w ≡ (P +m3 − r ⌊N1/3⌋) z (mod N)
with 1 ≤ w < N2/3.
• Let u = w + r ⌊N1/3⌋ z, thus
u ≡ (P +m3)z (mod N)
and 1 ≤ u < N2/3+ε (provided that N is large enough).
• Try to factor u using the elliptic curve factoring method which requires
exp
(
(2 + o(1))
√
log p log log p
)
(logN)O(1) bit operations, where p =
P2(u). Abort this steps if this takes longer then some selected time
bound. Thus we abort this steps if P2(u) is large.
• Try to find x, y with u = xy and 1 ≤ x, y < 2ℓ.
• If successful, compute m1, m2, m3, otherwise try another pair (u, z).
The above works because eventually we hit a reasonably good u of the
form u = P (u)v where p = P (u) ≤ 2√u and P (v) = P2(u) is small.
For such a u it is easy to find a representation u = xy with integers x
and y of the desired size, 1 ≤ x, y ≤ 2ℓ.
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The algorithm seems to be very hard to analyze rigorously, but the heuris-
tic analysis given in [110] predicts the runtime as LN (1/3, 1) which is sub-
stantially faster than
LN
(
1/3,
(
128
27
)1/3)
≈ LN(1/3, 1.68),
where
LN (α, γ) = exp
(
(γ + o(1))(logN)α(log logN)1−α
)
.
for N →∞.
Furthermore, Lenstra & Shparlinski [110] give a 1024-bit affine padding
forgery example while direct factorization of moduli of this size is currently
beyond reach.
A challenging open question is to find a way to use more signatures and
thereby extend the range of ℓ which can be attacked. Recent progress on
this question, from a rather unexpected direction, can be found in a work by
Joux, Naccache & Thome´ [101].
Finally, although unrelated, other recreative applications of ad-hoc fac-
toring in cryptanalysis can be found in [47] and [48].
9.5 Desmedt-Odlyzko Attack
The attacks that we have just described work because of the inability of the
affine padding to eradicate the homomorphic properties of RSA. However,
there are other attacks that apply in theory to any type of message padding.
In [55], Desmedt & Odlyzko describe an existential RSA signature forgery
scenario. Here, the opponent is allowed to query from the legitimate signer
e-th roots (signatures) of validly padded messages of his choosing. Having
done so, the opponent crafts a new validly padded signature of his own on a
message left unsigned by the legitimate signer. The attack works as follows:
Step 1: Select a bound y and let p1, . . . , ps be the primes up to y, that is,
s = π(y).
Step 2: Find k + 1 messages mi which are y-smooth and factor them
mi =
k∏
j=1
p
αi,j
j
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(for example, using elliptic curve factorization [111] or trial division).
Step 3: Solve in u1, . . . , uk ∈ {0, . . . , e− 1}
k∑
i=1
αi,jui ≡ αk+1 (mod e), j = 1, . . . , k,
and write
k∑
i=1
αi,jui + γie = αk+1, j = 1, . . . , k.
Thus
mk+1 ≡ re
k∏
i=1
muii (mod N),
where
r =
k∏
j=1
p
γj
j .
Step 4: Obtain from the legitimate signer the signatures si on mi for i =
1, . . . , k and forge the signature on mk+1 as
s ≡ r
k∏
i=1
suii ≡ r
k∏
i=1
mduii (mod N).
We see that s is a valid signature since:
se ≡ re
k∏
i=1
meduii ≡ re
k∏
i=1
muii ≡ mdk+1 (mod N).
Clearly, in a real-life scenario, instead of generating the y-smooth mes-
sages m1, . . . , mk on which valid signatures are required, the attacker may
also passively monitor the legitimate date exchange and test each signed
message for smoothness, putting aside smooth messages together with their
signatures.
Using such a strategy, the expected occurrence of a smooth m is about
once in
N
Ψ(N, y)
= u
(1+o(1))uN
N
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signature rounds, where
uN =
logN
log y
(under the assumption that m < N is random).
Thus, the effort of collecting y messages is yu
(1+o(1))uN
N which for
y = exp
(√
0.5 logN log logN
)
optimizes as exp
(√
(2 + o(1)) logN log logN
)
.
Coppersmith, Coron, Grieu, Halevi, Jutla, Naccache & Stern [45] added
a number of improvements and generalizations to this attack and applied it
successfully to a number of industry standards.
9.6 Small Prime Based Public-Key Encryption
Products of small primes can also be used for public-key encryption. The
idea, due to Naccache & Stern [131], is based on the following problem:
Given a prime p, a positive integer f < p and a set of integers
{v1, . . . , vn}, find a binary vector x such that
f ≡
n∏
i=1
vxii (mod p),
if such a vector exists.
It is easy to observe that if the v1, . . . , vn are relatively prime and much
smaller than p, then the exponent vector x can be found in polynomial time
by factoring f . Indeed, instances where
p >
n∏
i=1
vi and gcd (vi, vj) = 1, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n,
are easy.
Such an easy instance can be hidden by extracting the s-th modular root
of each vi, where s is a secret integer with gcd(s, p− 1) = 1.
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More formally, let p be a large public prime and denote by n the largest
integer such that:
p >
n∏
i=1
pi
where pi is the i-th prime.
The secret-key s < p− 1 is a random integer such that gcd(p− 1, s) = 1
and the public-keys are the s-th roots:
ui ≡ pri ≡ p1/si (mod p), 0 ≤ ui < p, i = 1, . . . , n,
where r satisfies
rs ≡ 1 (mod p− 1).
An n-bit message (m1, . . . , mn) is encrypted as
c ≡
n∏
i=1
umii (mod p)
and recovered by computing
f ≡ cs (mod p), 0 ≤ t < p,
and then
mi =
{
0, if pi ∤ f,
1, if pi | f, i = 1, . . . , n.
We refer the reader to [131] and [37] for more information on this some-
what unusual public-key encryption scheme, whose encoding idea dates back
to 1931, see Section 9.7.
9.7 Go¨del Numbers
In his famous work published in 1931, Go¨del [79] uses a mapping of mathe-
matical expressions into integers based on divisibility by small prime factors.
Go¨del [79] starts by assigning a unique natural number τ(ξ) to each basic
mathematical symbol ξ in the formal language of arithmetic he is dealing
with3 (in other words τ is a symbol-to-integer dictionary).
3for example, ξ ∈ {∃, ∀,⇒,+,−,×,÷, 0, 1, 2, . . .}
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To encode an entire mathematical expression Ξ, which is nothing but an
ordered sequence of mathematical symbols:
Ξ = 〈ξ1, . . . , ξn〉.
Go¨del [79] uses the following system: Each atomic symbol being associated
to a positive integer via τ , the mathematical expression is mapped into IN
as:
τ(Ξ) =
n∏
i=1
p
τ(ξi)
i ∈ IN, (23)
where pi stands for the i-th prime.
Given that any number obtained this way can be uniquely factored into
prime factors, it is possible to effectively and unambiguously recover any
mathematical expression Ξ from its Go¨del number τ(Ξ) (23).
Go¨del [79] uses this scheme at two levels: first, to encode sequences of
symbols representing formulae, and second, to encode sequences of formulae
representing proofs. This has allowed him to show a correspondence between
statements about natural numbers and statements about the provability of
theorems dealing with natural numbers, which is the cornerstone of the cel-
ebrated Go¨del Incompleteness Theorem [79].
9.8 Error Correction with Products of Small Primes
Interestingly, Go¨del’s encoding (23) can also be used for error correction.
Error-correcting codes are used to protect information sent over noisy
channels against transmission errors. In [49, 130], Coron & Naccache describe
an unusual error-correcting code based on modular arithmetic.
Let m be the n-bit message to encode; we denote by mi the i-th bit of
m. We let pi be the i-th prime, starting with p1 = 2. Let t be the number of
errors which can be corrected. We generate a prime p such that:
2p2tn ≤ p < 4p2tn (24)
(which, of course, always exists).
Given m, we generate the following “redundancy”:
c(m) ≡
n∏
i=1
pmii (mod p), 0 ≤ c(m) < p. (25)
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The integer c(m) is protected by using an error-correcting code µ resilient
to t transmission errors.
The encoded message E(m) is defined as E(m) = 〈m,µ(c(m))〉.
Let E˜(m) be the received version of E(m) where at most t errors occurred:
E˜(m) = E(m)⊕ e
where e is an error vector of Hamming weight at most t, and ⊕ stands for
bit-wise addition.
Splitting e = 〈em, ec〉 into parts corresponding to errors inm and to errors
in µ(c(m)), we obtain
E˜(m) = 〈m˜, c˜(m)〉 = 〈m⊕ em, µ(c(m))⊕ ec〉.
Since µ can correct t errors, and ec is only a part of e (whose total
Hamming weight is t), c(m) can be safely recovered from µ(c(m))⊕ ec.
The receiver computes:
s ≡ c(m˜)
c(m)
≡ c(m⊕ em)
c(m)
(mod p).
Using (25) the integer s can be written as:
s ≡ a/b (mod p),
where
a =
∏
i=1,...,n
emi=1
mi=0
pi and b =
∏
i=1,...,n
emi=0
mi=1
pi.
Since m˜ suffered at most t errors, we have
max{a, b} < ptn.
A result of Stern, Fouque & Wackers [149] shows that given s one can
recover a and b efficiently. The algorithm is based on the Gauss reduction
algorithm for finding the shortest vector in a two-dimensional lattice [162].
More precisely, let p be an prime with p > 2AB for some A ∈ IR and B ∈ IR.
Let a, b ∈ ZZ be such that |a| ≤ A and 0 < b ≤ B. Then given p, A, B and
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s ≡ ab−1 (mod p), one can recover a and b in polynomial time. Note that
the condition p > 2AB guarantees the uniqueness of a and b. A very similar
argument has been used in Section 9.4 to find small solutions to (22).
Taking A = B = ptn − 1, we have from (24) that 2AB < p. Moreover,
0 ≤ a ≤ A and 0 < b ≤ B. Therefore, we can recover a and b from s in
polynomial time. By testing the divisibility of a and b by the small primes
p1, . . . , pn, one can recover em = m˜⊕m and hence m = m˜⊕ em.
The process assumes the existence of an error correcting code µ. Note
that µ can be nothing but the procedure that we have just presented in
miniature. In other words, the described encoding procedure can be iterated
to protect c(m) using a new, much smaller, set of primes. In turn, yet another
encoding iteration is used at the third level of encoding and so on. Finally,
the smallest and last layer can be protected by simple replication (2t + 1
times) and decoded using a majority vote.
The proposed code turns out to provide efficient decoding for some specific
parameter combinations. For instance, denoting by µ Reed-Muller encoding,
and assuming that 5812-bit messages need to be protected against 31 trans-
mission errors, the size of µ(m) is 8192 bits, whereas the hybrid encoding
〈m,µ(c(m))〉 is only 7860 bits long.
More examples and details can be found in [49, 130]. The full asymptotic
analysis of this scheme still remains to be worked out.
9.9 Private Information Retrieval with Products of
Small Primes
A Private Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme is a combination of encod-
ing and encryption which allows a user to retrieve the k-th bit of an n-bit
database, without revealing to the database owner the value of k.
Gentry & Ramzan [76] have used the Chinese Remainder Theorem and
properties of products of small primes to design a PIR scheme. The construc-
tion of [76] requires a cyclic group G whose order t = #G has a prescribed
arithmetic structure; namely a product of a large prime and a very smooth
integers. This makes the results of [11, 137, 159] relevant to this problem,
see also Section 6.4.
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9.10 Zero-Knowledge with Products of Small Primes
A zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) is a protocol allowing Alice to convince Bob
that she knows a secret s without revealing to Bob information on s.
The best-known ZKP is probably the protocol of Fiat & Shamir [60] which
uses an RSA modulus N and k quadratic residues vi as public parameters.
In its simplest version, Alice uses the k modular square roots si such that
s2i ≡ vi (mod N) as secret identification keys. The protocol is:
• Alice picks a random r ∈ ZZN and sends to Bob x ≡ r2 (mod N).
• Bob picks a random binary vector
e = 〈e0, . . . , ek−1〉
and sends it to Alice.
• Alice replies to Bob with:
y ≡ r
k−1∏
i=0
seii (mod N).
• Bob verifies that:
y2 ≡ x
k−1∏
i=0
veii (mod N).
To ease Bob’s computational burden, Micali & Shamir [125] suggest to
use very small vi-values. As it turns out, using small primes as vi-values
presents particular security and simplicity advantages.
9.11 The Generalized Diffie-Hellman Problem
Recently, several cryptographic schemes based on the following assumption
appeared:
Let g be an element of prime order p of a “generic” Abelian group G. That
is, we assume that G is a group where only “generic” attacks, such as Shanks’
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or Pollard’s algorithms exist and take about
√
p operations, see [30, Sec-
tions 10.3 and 10.4], or [123, Sections 3.6.2 and 3.6.3], or [151, Sections 6.2.1
and 6.2.2]. For example, one may regard G as the group of points on an
elliptic curve over a finite field.
The traditional Diffie-Hellman problem is defined as follows:
Given gx and gy, compute gxy.
Solving this problem is believed to be hard.
Due to the identity
g2xy = g(x+y)
2
g−x
2
g−y
2
and the fact that computing square roots in groups of prime order is easy
the Diffie-Hellman problem can be reformulated in a shorter form:
Given gx, compute gx
2
.
On the other hand, many cryptographic protocols rely on the presumed
hardness of the following generalized Diffie-Hellman problem:
Given n powers gx, . . . gx
n
, compute gx
n+1
.
Intuitively it may seem that, despite the fact that more information on
x leaks out in the generalized Diffie-Hellman settings solving it is not easier
than solving the traditional Diffie-Hellman problem with the same parame-
ters.
Surprisingly, Brown & Gallant [29] and Cheon [35], have shown this in-
tuition to be wrong.
Here are some results of Cheon [35]:
• given gx and gxd for some d | p − 1, one can find x in time about
O
(√
p/d+
√
d
)
(which is O (p1/4) for d ∼ √p);
• given gx, . . . gxd for some d | p + 1, one can find x in time about
O
(√
p/d+ d
)
(which is O (p1/3) for d ∼ p1/3).
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This brings up the question of estimating the probability at which primes
p are such that p± 1 has a divisor d of a given size.
More specifically, how rare are primes p such that p ± 1 has a divisor
d ∈ [n1−ε, n]? (which guarantees the asymptotically best advantage if we are
given gx, . . . gx
n
with n which is not too large).
By the result of Ford from Section 8.4 we know that for every ε > 0 this
happens for a positive proportion of primes p.
Therefore, we conclude that the attack of [35] can be applied in its asymp-
totically strongest form with a positive probability. In other words, the gen-
eralized Diffie-Hellman problem is easier than the traditional Diffie-Hellman
problem.
In practical scenarios probably only small values of d can be used. In this
case the bound (17) can be applied.
9.12 Large Subgroup Attack
The Digital Signature Algorithm uses two large primes p and q such that q |
(p− 1), see [30, Section 12.6], or [123, Section 11.5.1], or [151, Section 7.4.2],
Suppose that p and q are generated using the following straightforward
method:
• select a random m-bit prime q;
• randomly generate k-bit integers n until a prime p = 2nq+1 is reached.
In [122], Menezes introduces the Large Subgroup Attack on some crypto-
graphic protocols, including a version of the HMQV protocol, see also [124].
The attack can be applied if n = (p− 1)/(2q) has a smooth divisor s > q.
Some upper bounds on the density of such primes with a large smooth divisor
are given by Pomerance & Shparlinski [137].
However this result does not take into account the special structure of p
(for example, the presence of a large prime divisor q | (p− 1)), so it does not
(quite) apply.
Furthermore, in the above situation lower bounds become more impor-
tant. Determining such bounds is unfortunately a much harder question.
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On the other hand, using the results of Banks & Shparlinski [11] and
Tenenbaum [159] mentioned in Section 6.4 one can get an estimate of the
probability η(k, ℓ,m) that a k-bit integer n has a divisor s > 2m which is
2ℓ-smooth. Then, assuming that shifted primes p− 1 behave like “random”
integers, one can address the original question (at least heuristically).
The most interesting choice of parameters as we write these lines is:
k = 863, m = 160, ℓ = 80
(which produces a 1024-bit prime p).
It has been shown in [11] that for these parameters, the theoretic estimates
(together with some heuristic assumptions about the distribution of primes
in the sequence 2qn + 1 for n having a large smooth part) suggest that the
attack succeeds with probability
η(863, 80, 160) ≈ 0.09576 > 9.5%
over the choices of p and q.
We also note that similar attacks on the ElGamal signature scheme and
the Diffie Hellman key exchange protocols, have been outlined by Anderson
& Vaudenay [2].
9.13 Smooth Orders
Let l(n) be the multiplicative order of 2 modulo n, gcd(2, n) = 1 (in the
following 2 can be replaces by any integer a 6= 0,±1).
Motivated by several cryptographic applications, Pomerance & Shparlin-
ski [137] has studied the smoothness of l(n) on integers and on shifted primes
n = p−1. This arises from the desire to clarify whether g = 2 can safely serve
as an exponentiation base in discrete logarithm based cryptosystems4. How-
ever, in order to avoid the Pohlig-Hellman attack l(n) must not be smooth,
see [30, Section 10.5], or [123, Section 3.6.4], or [151, Section 6.2.3].
Also, Boneh & Venkatesan [24] have shown that the Diffie-Hellman pro-
tocol with the g = 2 has some additional attractive bit security properties
which are not known for other g values.
4Small values of g allow to significantly speed up square-and-multiply exponentiation.
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Finally we recall that Pollard’s (p−1)-factorization method works better
when p | n features a smooth l(p), see [30, Section 9.2], or [50, Section 5.4],
or [123, Section 3.2.3], or [151, Section 5.6.1] for details. Some improvements
of this algorithm have recently been suggested by Zralek [167].
Let us define the following counting functions:
L(x, y) = #{p ≤ x : l(p) is y-smooth}
and
N(x, y) = #{n ≤ x : l(n) is y-smooth}.
Pomerance & Shparlinski [137] have shown that for
exp
(√
log x log log x
)
≤ y ≤ x,
we have
L(x, y)≪ u ρ
(u
2
)
π(x).
It is also noticed in [137] that it seems quite plausible that in fact the
bound also holds with ρ(u) instead of ρ(u/2), which means that the values
of l(p) behave as “random” integers.
In fact, this may even happen to be provable under the Generalized Rie-
mann Hypothesis. However this has not been worked out yet and remains
an interesting open question.
Furthermore, Banks, Friedlander, Pomerance & Shparlinski [10] proved
that for
exp
(√
log x log log x
)
≤ y ≤ x
we have
N(x, y) ≤ x exp
(
−
(
1
2
+ o(1)
)
u log log u
)
.
As in the case of L(x, y), one may expect that the same bound should
hold with 1 instead of 1/2 in the exponent, but the appearance of log log u
instead of log u seems to be right, see also Section 7.5.
9.14 Smooth-Order Based Public Key Encryption
Smooth orders can also be used constructively to provide public key encryp-
tion. Here is one such suggestion due to Naccache & Stern [132]:
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Parameter Generation: Let s be a odd, squarefree, y-smooth integer,
where y is a certain small parameter and let N = pq be an RSA modulus
such that
s | ϕ(n) and gcd
(
s,
ϕ(N)
s
)
= 1.
Typically, we think of y as being a 10 bit integer and consider N to be at
least 768 bits long. Let g be an element whose multiplicative order modulo
N is a large multiple of s. Publish N , g and keep p, q and s secret (note
that there are very few possibilities for s so its revealing does not give any
dramatic advantage to the attacker).
Generation of the modulus appears rather straightforward: pick a family
p1 < . . . < pk of 2k small odd distinct primes and set:
u =
k∏
i=1
p2i−1, v =
k∏
i=1
p2i−1, s = uv =
k∏
i=1
pi (26)
(thus s is pk-smooth).
Find (using trials and primality testing) two large primes ℓ and r such
that both p = 2ℓu+ 1 and q = 2rv + 1 are prime and let N = pq.
Note that much faster key generation procedures exist, we refer the reader
to [132] for more details.
To generate g, one can choose it at random in ZZN and check whether
it has the possible order ϕ(N)/4 or ϕ(N)/2 modulo N , Note that for any
N multiplicative orders of elements of ZZN are divisors of the Carmichael
function λ(N); in the above case λ(N) = ϕ(N)/2.
The main point is to ensure that g is not a pi-th power modulo N for
each i = 1, . . . , k by testing that
gϕ(n)/pi 6≡ 1 (mod N), i = 1, . . . , k.
The success probability is:
ρ =
k∏
i=1
(
1− 1
pi
)
.
If the p1, . . . , pk are the first k odd primes, this in turn can be estimated
by the Mertens formula as ρ ∼ 1/ log k. Another method consists in choos-
ing, for each index i ≤ k, a random gi until it is not a pi-th power. With
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overwhelming probability
g =
k∏
i=1
g
s/pi
i
has the multiplicative order at least ϕ(n)/4.
Encryption: A message m < s is encrypted as
c ≡ gm (mod N).
Decryption: The algorithm computes the value mi of the residue of m
modulo each prime factor pi, i = 1, . . . , k of s given by (26), and recovers the
message by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, following an idea of Pohlig-
Hellman [135], see also [50, 123].
Now for every i = 1, . . . , k, to find mi, given the ciphertext c ≡ gm
(mod N), the algorithm computes
ci ≡ cϕ(n)/pi ≡ gmϕ(n)/pi ≡ gmiϕ(n)/pi (mod N),
where the congruence m ≡ mi (mod pi) is used at the last step.
By comparing this result with all possible powers
gjϕ(n)/pi , j = 0, . . . , pi − 1,
the algorithm finds out the correct value of mi.
The basic operation used by this (non-optimized) algorithm is a modular
exponentiation of complexity O ((logN)3), repeated at most :
kpk ≪ k2 log k ≪ (logN)2 log logN
times. Decryption therefore takes O ((logN)5 log logN) bit operations.
We refer the reader to [132] for more details and optimizations.
9.15 Oracle-Assisted Integer Factorization
Maurer [120] has designed an algorithm which for any ε, given an integer
N , requests at most ε logN bits of information and factors N in polynomial
time.
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Unfortunately a rigorous analysis of this algorithm requires very precise
results about the distribution of smooth numbers in short intervals which
currently seems to be beyond reach. Accordingly, the main result of [120] is
conditional and relies on heuristic assumptions.
9.16 Pratt Trees
Highly critical security applications sometimes require primality proofs. Here
is a way to provide such proofs, due to Pratt [138]
• Check that the would-be prime p is not a perfect power. This is easy,
see, for example, [16, 17].
• Produce a primitive root g modulo p and provide a proof of this. For
that sake it is enough to verify that
gp−1 6≡ 1 (mod p) and g(p−1)/q 6≡ 1 (mod p)
for all prime divisors q | (p− 1), so the list of these primes q must also
be supplied.
• Give a proof that each such q is prime by iterating the above procedure.
The whole algorithm can be viewed as a tree, called the Pratt Tree, where
each node contains a prime (with p as a root) and with 2 at each leaf.
The algorithm runs in polynomial time and in particular shows that the
decision problem PRIMES is in the complexity class NP (which is not so
exciting nowadays given that, thanks to [1], we know that PRIMES is actually
in P).
Pratt [138] has shown that the number of multiplications required by this
algorithm is O((log p)2). On the other hand, Bayless [13] shows that this
number is at least C log p for any fixed C > 1 and for almost all primes p.
There are, however, many other interesting questions about this tree,
such as estimating its height, number of nodes, number of leaves, and so on,
in extreme cases and also for almost all primes.
For example, it is obvious that the Pratt Tree’s height H(p) satisfies the
inequality
H(p)≪ log p. (27)
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One can also infer from more general results of Ka´tai [104] that for some
constant c > 0 the inequality
H(p) ≥ c log log p (28)
holds for almost all primes p.
Ford, Konyagin & Luca [67] have recently given a heuristic argument
suggesting that
H(p)≫ log p
log log p
for infinitely many primes p and also a rigorous proof that
H(p)≪ (log p)0.9622
holds for almost all p. It is also shown in [67] that (28) holds for almost all
primes p with any
c <
1
1 + log 2
.
It seems that the lower bound (28) is of the right order of magnitude and in
fact some heuristic arguments, given in [67], lead to the conjecture that
H(p) = e log log p+O(log log log p)
for almost all primes p.
A number of other challenging open questions and conjectures can be
found in [67].
Studying other characteristics of the Pratt Tree is also an interesting and
little-researched open question.
For instance, Banks & Shparlinski [12] have shown that the length L(p)
of the chain p 7→ P (p− 1) satisfies
L(p) ≥ (1 + o(1)) log log p
log log log p
(29)
for almost all primes p. This corresponds to a particular path in the Pratt
Tree. Furthermore, it may be natural to expect that this should actually be
the longest path for almost all primes, so it is possible that
L(p) = (1 + o(1))H(p)
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for almost all primes p. On the other hand, it seems that L(p) < H(p)
holds for almost all primes p. Clarifying the matter is an important research
challenge. As a first step one may for instance try to use the methods of [67,
104] to improve (29) up to the level of (28).
9.17 Strong Primes
A prime p is called strong if p− 1 and p+ 1 have a large prime divisor, and
p−1 has a prime divisor r such that r−1 has a large prime divisor, see [123,
Section 4.4.2].
To make this definition more formal we say that p is y-strong if p+1 has
a large prime divisor q ≥ y, and p− 1 has a prime divisor r such that r − 1
has a prime divisor ℓ ≥ y.
We note that the combination of [10] and [137] (see Sections 7.3 and 7.5)
implies that almost all primes are y-strong as log x/ log y →∞.
Indeed, the cardinality of the set of primes p ≤ x such that p + 1 is
y-smooth is exactly the function π1(x, y) discussed in Section 7.3.
From the set of remaining primes p ≤ x we remove those for which p− 1
is divisible by r2 for a prime r ≥ y. Since the number of primes p ≤ x with
p ≡ 1 (mod r2) is at most x/r2, the cardinality of this set can be estimated
trivially as ∑
r≥y
x
r2
= O (x/y) .
Hence it is easy to see that if one of the remaining primes is not y-strong
then ϕ(p− 1) is y-smooth and thus the bounds of Π−1(x, y) from Section 7.5
can be applied.
9.18 Small Prime Based Hash Functions
The Very Smooth Hash function, VSH, recently introduced and studied by
Contini, Lenstra & Steinfeld [42], is defined as follows.
Let pi denote the i-th prime number and let
Qk =
k∏
i=1
pi
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denote the product of the first k primes.
Assume that integers k and N satisfy
Qk < N ≤ Qk+1. (30)
Let the message length ℓ < 2k be a positive integer whose k-bit represen-
tation (including all leading zeros) is ℓ = λ1 . . . λk that is
ℓ =
k∑
i=1
λi2
i−1.
The VSH takes an ℓ-bit message m = µ1, . . . , µℓ and hashes it (in a very
efficient way, via a simple iterative procedure) to
hN(m) ≡
k∏
i=1
peii (mod N), 0 ≤ hN(m) < N,
where L = ⌈ℓ/k⌉, µs = 0, for ℓ < s ≤ Lk, µLk+i = λi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and
ei =
L∑
j=0
µjk+i2
L−j, i = 1, . . . , k.
It is demonstrated in [42] that the VSH also admits a rigorous collision-
resistance proof based on “natural” number theoretic problems which are
presumably hard. As the above problem is related to factoring, it is natural
to choose N = pq to be an RSA modulus. The design and the suggested
parameter choice are both based on classical facts about the distribution of
smooth numbers.
In [18], Blake & Shparlinski harness results about the distribution of
smooth numbers to provide rigorous support in favor of the security and the
distribution properties of the VSH. In particular, [18] shows that for almost
all RSA moduli and any integer a, the probability that for a random ℓ-bit
message m we have hN (m) ≡ a (mod N), is negligible for sufficiently large
values of ℓ.
This bounds the collision probability and also the probability of finding
a second pre-image by brute force.
The above and several other results in [18] are based on the study of the
multiplicative subgroup of ZZ∗N generated by p1, . . . , pk for integers N = pq
where p and q are distinct primes, satisfying the inequality (30).
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10 Conclusion
Our goal has been to position this paper at the crossroads of cryptogra-
phy and number theory. We hope that while reading it cryptographers have
enriched their arsenal with a large gamut of little-used, yet powerful, number-
theoretic methods and results extending beyond the classical facts used in
cryptology. On the other hand, it is our hope that number theorists have
enjoyed learning how smooth numbers can be harnessed to provide encryp-
tion, private information retrieval, identification, error correction, hashing,
primality proofs and other cryptographic functions. Furthermore, final tun-
ing and adjusting already known results and techniques may lead to new
advances of intrinsic mathematical interest. Our outline, somewhat sketchy
and simplified and also sometimes ignoring subtleties, cannot replace a care-
ful and systematic reading of the original number theoretic and cryptographic
literature, such as [50, 86, 91, 100, 156] and [32, 123, 151], respectively.
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